A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness by James Cox et al.











Abstract We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences. The
income distribution and the kindness or unkindness of others’ choices (“intentions”)
systematically aﬀect a person’s emotional state. The emotional state systematically
aﬀects the marginal rate of substitution between own and others’ payoﬀs, and thus
the person’s subsequent choices. The model is applied to two sets of laboratory data:
simple binary choice mini-ultimatum games, and Stackelberg duopoly games with a
range of choices. The results conﬁrm that other-regarding preferences respond to
others’ intentions as well as to the income distribution.
We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for research support (grant numbers SES-9818561
and DUE-0226344). We are also grateful to Ken Binmore, Gary Charness, Steﬀen Huck, Lori Kletzer,
Lisa Rutstrum, and Daniel Zizzo for helpful comments.
1Before any thing, therefore, can be the complete and proper object, either of gratitude
or resentment, it must possess three diﬀerent qualiﬁcations. First it must be the cause
of pleasure in the one case, and of pain in the other. Secondly, it must be capable of
feeling these sensations. And, thirdly, it must not only have produced these sensations,
but it must have produced them from design, and from a design that is approved of in
the one case and disapproved of in the other.
– Adam Smith (1759, p. 181)
1 Introduction
Everyone knows that people care about other people. Economists have known it at least
since Adam Smith, but only recently have begun to recognize the need for explicit models.
Under what circumstances will I bear a personal cost to help or harm you? What is the
marginal rate of substitution between my own payoﬀ and yours? The goal of this paper is
to propose a model that addresses such questions and, using some existing laboratory data,
to illustrate its application.
Many things may aﬀect how I care about you, but two general motives stand out. First
is status, or relative position: are you a member of my family, or my boss or employee, or a
wealthy or poor neighbor? In the laboratory data, the most prominent such variable is the
distribution of income: what is your current payoﬀ relative to my current payoﬀ?
A second motive is reciprocity: how do I respond to your intentions towards me? If I
think you have helped me in the past or want to help me in the future, I am more likely
to value your welfare. Of course, economists are familiar with folk theorem arguments
that I help you now so that you will help me later and thereby increase the net present
value of my payoﬀ stream. Reciprocity here refers to something quite diﬀerent, although
complementary: if you are my friend, I ﬁnd it pleasurable to increase your material payoﬀ,
whether or not it aﬀects the present value of my own material payoﬀ. Negative reciprocity
is also included: if you are my foe (e.g., I think you have harmed me or my friends, or will do
so when you have the opportunity), I enjoy decreasing your material payoﬀ. Smith (1759)
2refers to these emotions as the “moral sentiments” of gratitude and resentment, and suggests
three necessary conditions for their proper expression.
Our model formalizes the idea. In the model, status and reciprocity aﬀect my emotional
state, summarized in a scalar variable θ, and my emotional state aﬀects my choices. Smith’s
resentment corresponds to negative θ and gratitude corresponds to positive θ. The model
retains the conventional assumption that I choose an available alternative that maximizes my
utility function, and follows recent contributions in allowing the utility function to depend
on your material payoﬀ y as well as my own material payoﬀ m. The simplest example is
u(m,y)=m + θy. The key innovation is to model the emotional state θ as systematically
aﬀected by the reciprocity motive r as well as by the status motive s.
Section 2 sets the stage by summarizing recent related literature. Section 3 below
proposes speciﬁcations of the model elements r, s,a n dθ, and proposes a more general utility
function that allows non-linear indiﬀerence curves. Section 4 applies the model to laboratory
data from mini-ultimatum games, simple extensive form games where both players have
binary choices. Section 5 applies the model to laboratory data from Stackelberg duopoly
games, where both players have a range of choices. Section 6 suggests further applications,
and Section 7 oﬀers a concluding discussion. Technical details from Sections 3 and 5 appear
in the appendices.
2 Recent Approaches
Economic models traditionally assume that decision-makers are exclusively motivated by
material self-interest. Maximization of own material payoﬀ predicts behavior quite well
in many contexts. Examples include competitive markets, even when gains from trade go
almost entirely to sellers or almost entirely to buyers (Smith and Williams, 1990); one-sided
auctions with independent private values (Cox and Oaxaca, 1996); procurement contracting
(Cox, Isaac, Cech, and Conn, 1996); and search (Cason and Friedman, 2003; Cox and
Oaxaca, 1989, 2000; Harrison and Morgan, 1990).
3Maximization of own material payoﬀ predicts poorly in a variety of other contexts.
Examples include ultimatum games (G¨ uth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Slonim
and Roth, 1998), voluntary contribution of public goods games (especially such games that
allow costly opportunities for punishing free riders, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and
experimental labor markets (e.g., Fehr, G¨ achter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997). Fehr and G¨ achter
(2000) summarize recent evidence on the economic impact of motives beyond self-interest.
The laboratory data, together with suggestive ﬁeld data, have encouraged the develop-
ment of models of other-regarding preferences. This literature falls into two broad classes.
First there are the relative payoﬀ (or distributional) models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Charness and Rabin (2002), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadi-
raj (2002a). To facilitate comparison with our speciﬁcations, we write out two-player ver-
sions of these models.
The Fehr-Schmidt model has piecewise linear indiﬀerence curves over my income m and
your income y, with two marginal rate of substitution parameters 0 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ 1 for the





m − α(y − m), if m<y ,
m − β (m − y), if m ≥ y.
That is, I like own income and dislike income inequality, especially when I have the short
end. For two players, the Charness-Rabin distributional model looks the same except that
the MRS parameters have fewer restrictions, and so can include competitive preferences
(β<0 <α ), inequality- or diﬀerence-averse preferences (α>0,β>0), and quasi-maximin
preferences (1 >β>−α>0). The Bolton-Ockenfels model also assumes that I like own








The function v is assumed to be globally non-decreasing and concave in the ﬁrst argument, to
be strictly concave in the second argument (relative income m
m+y), and to satisfy v2(m, 1
2)=0
for all m. The Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2002a) model includes nonlinear indiﬀerence curves





(mα + θ− y α)1/α, if m<y ,
(mα + θ+ y α)1/α, if m ≥ y,
with parameter restrictions 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ θ− ≤ θ+ ≤ 1, and θ− < 1 − θ+.T h u s I
am not averse to income inequality; I like own income and your income, but my marginal
rate of substitution depends on whose income is higher, and in comparing payoﬀ pairs
(m, y)=( c, d)a n d( m, y)=( d, c) I prefer (c, d)t o( d, c) when c>d .
The main alternatives so far to these distributional preference models are equilibrium
models that try to capture the reciprocity motive in terms of beliefs regarding inten-
tions. Building on the psychological games literature (e.g., Geanakoplos, Pearse and Stac-
chetti, 1989), Rabin (1993) develops a theory of fairness equilibria (for two player games in
normal form) based on the following representation of agents’ utilities. Deﬁne ai, bj,a n d
ci, respectively, as the strategy chosen by player i, the belief of player i about the strategy
chosen by player j, and the belief by player i about the belief by player j about the strategy
chosen by player i. Rabin (1993, pp. 1286-7) writes the expected utility function for player
i as
Ui(ai,b j,c i)=πi(ai,b j)+ ˜ fj(bj,c i)[1+fi(ai,b j)],
where πi(ai,b j) is the monetary payoﬀ to player i, ˜ fj(bj,c i)i sp l a y e ri’s belief about how
kind player j is being to him, and fi(ai,b j) is how kind player i is being to player j (relative
to a benchmark taken to be the average of the highest and lowest possible payoﬀs). Thus
negative reciprocity ( ˜ fj < 0a n dfi < −1) as well as positive reciprocity increases utility.
The model looks for equilibria in actions and beliefs about intended kindness; typically there
are many such equilibria.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) propose an extension to extensive form games with
N players, and Falk and Fischbacher (2001) propose a diﬀerent extension that also cov-
ers incomplete information but uses a distributional preference utility function. Charness
and Rabin (2002), in addition to their distributional model, also propose an equilibrium
5model involving distributional preferences and beliefs about other players intentions. All
the models are complex and have many equilibria, and so seem intractable in most applica-
tions. Such problems seem unavoidable for models that assume equilibrium in higher order
beliefs.
Levine (1998) improves tractability by replacing beliefs about others’ intentions by es-
timates of others’ types. In his model, players’ utilities are linear in their own monetary
payoﬀ m and in others’ monetary payoﬀs yj. For two player games, utilities are of the form
u(m,y)=m +
am + λa y
1+λ
y,
where am ∈ (−1, 1) is my type or “coeﬃcient of altruism,” ay ∈ (−1, 1) is my current
estimate of your type, and λ ∈ [0, 1] is a weight parameter. Levine demonstrates that his
model is consistent with data from some ultimatum game and market experiments, and it
clearly is more tractable than the previous equilibrium models.
We propose a more drastic simpliﬁcation. Instead of beliefs or type estimates we use
emotional states based on actual experience: my attitude towards your payoﬀs depends on
my state of mind, e.g., kind or vengeful, and your actual behavior systematically alters my
emotional state. Our model is consistent with the axiomatic approaches of Sobel (2001) and
Guttman (2000) but is more explicit. It is simply a preference model, not an equilibrium
model, and therefore sidesteps many of the complications involving higher order beliefs.
But unlike the distributional preference models discussed above, in our model an agent’s
distributional preferences are conditional on the revealed intentions of others.
Recent experiments compare the explanatory power of earlier models. Evidence contrary
to the (unconditional) distributional preference models includes the following. Kagel and
Wolfe (2001) ﬁnd that rejection rates in the ultimatum game are essentially unaﬀected
by unequal (high or low) contingent payments to a third (strategic dummy) player. In
four separate public goods experiments, Croson (1999) ﬁnds positive relations between own
contribution and (a) own beliefs about others’ contributions and (b) actual contributions
of others, especially with the median of others’ contributions. In mini-ultimatum games
6(discussed further in Section 4 below), Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) ﬁnd that the
rejection rate for a [2 of 10] oﬀer declined as the alternative oﬀer (not chosen by the proposer)
became less favorable to the respondent. They also ﬁnd that people punish even when the
punishment does not reduce payoﬀ inequality. Brandts and Charness (2000) ﬁnd that
deception in the prior cheap talk stage signiﬁcantly increases the punishment rate, and
some subjects reward favorable sender behavior. Blount (1995) ﬁnds that responders in her
ultimatum games accepted lower oﬀers when they were randomly generated than when they
were chosen by human subjects. Oﬀerman (2002) has similar results: intentional helpful
(hurtful) actions were rewarded (punished) more frequently than identical but randomly
generated actions. See also Ahlert, Cr¨ uger, and G¨ uth (2001), Charness (2002), G¨ uth and
Kov´ acs (2001), Gibbons and Van Boven (2001), and Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996).
On the other hand, there are some empirical studies that seem more favorable to uncon-
ditional distributional preferences than to reciprocal preferences, including Bolton, Katok
and Zwick (1998) and Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998). Cason, Saijo, and Yam-
ato (2002) look at voluntary contributions public good games with a prior participation
decision. They conclude that “spite” is more prevalent in Japan than in US subject pools,
but eventually outcomes are more eﬃcient in Japan.
Cox (2002, 2004) uses a triadic experimental design to discriminate between actions
motivated by unconditional distributional preferences and actions motivated by reciprocity
considerations, in the context of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) investment game.
Using dictator game treatments as controls, the experiments support the conclusion that
behavior is signiﬁcantly motivated by altruism as well as by trust and positive reciprocity.
Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2002b) use a triadic design in the context of the moonlighting
game introduced to the literature by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2000). Cox et al. re-
port that altruism and positive reciprocity (but not negative reciprocity) are signiﬁcant
motives for behavior in the moonlighting game.
Cox and Deck (2002) report data from eleven experimental treatments involving 692
7subjects that provide a systematic exploration of the existence and nature of motives for
reciprocal behavior in two-person games. The triadic experimental design supports dis-
crimination between motivations of reciprocity and (non-reciprocal) altruism. They ﬁnd
signiﬁcant positive reciprocity in the trust (or mini-investment) game when it is run with a
single-blind protocol but not when it is run with a double-blind protocol. They do not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant negative reciprocity in the “punishment” game (i.e., the (5, 5) mini-ultimatum
game) when it is run with a double blind protocol in a triadic design.
In summary, the laboratory evidence conﬁrms that people do care about others’ payoﬀs
as well as their own. The marginal rate of substitution (between my payoﬀ and yours) is not
constant, however, and may be aﬀected by reciprocity as well as distributional and other
status motives. There is room for a tractable model that can assess empirically the impact
of the various motives.
3 Model Speciﬁcations
This section presents a new model of preferences that incorporates objectively deﬁned vari-
ables r and s capturing reciprocity and status motives. For pedagogical and comparative
purposes, the presentation here considers only two player extensive form games of complete
information with ﬁrst mover F receiving material payoﬀ y, and second mover S receiving
material payoﬀ m. The model shows how the emotional state of S deﬁnes the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) between own payoﬀ m and other’s payoﬀ y, and how the emotional
state responds to the values of r and s that arise from F’s prior choice.
Due to its importance in existing literature, the distribution or relative payoﬀ is sepa-
rated from other aspects of the status motive, and is captured in the shape of indiﬀerence
curves in (m,y) space. To see this clearly, suppose for the moment that both payoﬀs are
positive and that the second mover has kind preferences (i.e., increasing in both own and
other’s payoﬀ). The indiﬀerence curves then have the usual negative slope. If preferences
are convex, the MRS increases as one moves along any indiﬀerence curve in the direction of
8increasing y/m ratio; see ﬁgure 1 (a). But y/m is a natural way to specify relative payoﬀ.
The MRS is independent of y/m when indiﬀerence curves are linear, and greater sensitivity
to y/m takes the form of more convex preferences.
With homothetic preferences, all indiﬀerence curves have the same slope where they
cross any given ray, y/m = constant; in this case relative payoﬀ dependence is well deﬁned.
Fortunately the convenient and well-known constant elasticity of substitution (CES) util-
ity function represents homothetic preferences. Written in general form, the CES utility
function is u(m, y)=( mα + θyα)1/α; see also Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2002a).
We modify this function slightly. The exponent 1/α is problematic when it applies
to a negative expression, which will arise when θ is suﬃciently negative. Of course, the
outside exponent doesn’t aﬀect the shape of the indiﬀerence curves, but its sign aﬀects their
ordering. The ordering is preserved and the negativity issue is ﬁnessed by using 1/α as a






α (mα + θyα),α  =0 ;
myθ,α =0 .
(1)
With these preferences we have MRS =
∂u/∂m
∂u/∂y = θ−1   y
m
 1−α. Hence the emotional
state θ is the willingness to pay (WTP =1 /MRS) at an allocation on the equal payoﬀ line
m = y. Preferences are linear (and MRS is constant) if α = 1, and preferences are strictly
convex (and MRS strictly increases in relative payoﬀ y/m along indiﬀerence curves) if and
only if α<1. Appendix A.1 shows that indiﬀerence curves for α  = 0 converge pointwise to
indiﬀerence curves of the Cobb-Douglas preferences u(m, y)=myθ as α → 0. A standard
textbook argument shows that as α →− ∞ , the indiﬀerence curves converge to Leontief
indiﬀerence curves with corners on the ray y/m = θ−1.
The emotional state θ is a function of the reciprocity motive r and the (residual) status
motive s. A natural speciﬁcation for the reciprocity variable is r(x)=m(x) − m0, where
m(x) is the maximum payoﬀ the second mover can guarantee himself given the ﬁrst mover’s
choice x,a n dm0 is m(x) when x is neutral in an appropriate sense. The idea is that
9the second mover regards additional payoﬀ as kindness to be reciprocated, and shortfalls
from m0 as violations of his property rights, to be negatively reciprocated.1 Often it is
convenient to normalize r(x) so that it lies in the range [−1,1]. Let mg =m a x x m(x)a n d
mb =m i n x m(x). The normalized version is r(x)=( m(x)−m0)/(mg−mb), when mg >m b,
and r = 0 otherwise.
The variable s represents relative status (other than relative payoﬀ, which is already
accounted for). Assume that social norms assign real (possibly integer) status values sF
and sS to the ﬁrst and second movers in the context of the game currently played; these
may depend on the roles played as well as on observable personal characteristics such as
gender, age, job title, etc. Then a natural speciﬁcation is s = sF − sS. For example, under
some social norms the ﬁrst mover’s status and hence s would increase if she had to earn the
right to be the ﬁrst mover.
In estimating the model, we maintain the following four assumptions.
A.1 Individuals choose so as to maximize a utility function of the form in equation (1).
A.2 The emotional state function θ = θ(r,s) is identical across individuals except for a
mean zero idiosyncratic term.
A.3 θ(r,s) is weakly increasing in r and s.
A.4 θ(0,0) is non-negative but θ(r,s) is negative when its arguments r and s are suﬃciently
negative.
The case of negative θ deserves a brief comment before presenting sample applications.
A person with negative θ is willing to pay to reduce other’s payoﬀ. That is, y is a “bad”
1 Konow (2001) elaborates an objective theory of m0 as a function of the agent’s relative actual eﬀort
levels (“accountability”), the eﬃcient eﬀort levels, the agents’ basic material needs, and the context. Konow
(2000) extends (part of) this theory to allow for self-serving subjective distortions of the objective m0,a n d
confronts evidence from dictator games. (In our framework, this game entails a strategic dummy ﬁrst mover.)
Konow (2003) surveys relevant moral philosophy and evidence. G¨ achter and Riedl (2003) oﬀer a general
discussion and demonstrate the impact of m0 (which they call moral property rights or entitlements) in new
laboratory data.
10rather than a “good,” and the indiﬀerence curves slope upward. CES preferences then have
one straight line indiﬀerence curve, the ray y/m = |θ|−1/α corresponding to u = 0, and the
slopes of other indiﬀerence curves converge towards the slope of this ray as in ﬁgure 1 (b).






































Figure 1: Indiﬀerence curves for the utility function u(m,y)=2 .5(m0.4 + θy0.4).
4 Evidence from Mini-Ultimatum Games
Mini-ultimatum games (Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson, 1995)2
have an especially simple structure that is amenable to our approach. As illustrated in
ﬁgure 2, the ﬁrst mover F (the “proposer”) oﬀers one of two possible positive payoﬀ vectors,
and the second mover S (the “responder”) either accepts the oﬀer, which then becomes the
actual payoﬀ vector, or else refuses, in which case the payoﬀ is (m, y)=( 0 , 0). In the 5/5
game, for example, if F chooses left (x = “Take”) then S chooses between payoﬀ vectors
(m(x),y(x)) = (2, 8) and (m, y)=( 0 , 0); if F chooses right (x = “Share”) then S chooses
between (m(x),y (x)) = (5, 5) and (m, y)=( 0 , 0).
With standard self-interested preferences, S always accepts a positive payoﬀ because
refusing gives him zero payoﬀ. Ultimatum games are interesting because S often rejects
2 Binmore condemns the term mini-ultimatum game or MUG, which we perpetuate, and favors ultimatum
mini-game. As a compromise, we urge readers to parse MUG as mini-[ultimatum game].
11positive oﬀers, and the mini-ultimatum game is especially interesting because, contrary
to the distributional models reviewed earlier, the rejection rate of the oﬀer (2, 8) varies
systematically across games with diﬀerent x = “Share” alternatives. We show that our





























































10  0 Game
Figure 2: Extensive forms of mini-ultimatum games.





0, if S chooses (0,0),
1, otherwise.
It is natural to use probit estimation, with explanatory variables derived as follows. Let
S’s property right m0 be his feasible payoﬀ that is closest to equal split but not higher
than the proposer’s, so m0 =m i n {5,m g}. In the 8/2 game in ﬁgure 2, the reciprocity
variable is r = 0 because the proposer has no real choice and mg = mb. In the other three
12games mg =m a x x{m(x)} > minx{m(x)} = mb and the normalized reciprocity variable
r(x)=( m(x) − m0)/(mg − mb) takes on a range of values.
The mini-ultimatum game data reported by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) contain
no variation in the status variable (other than relative payoﬀ), so s is constant. By As-
sumptions A.1 – A.4 and a ﬁrst order Taylor series approximation, second mover i has WTP
parameter θi = a+br+σ  i, where (for the constant value of s) a is the population average
value of θ at r =0 ,a n db is the non-negative responsiveness to r. Slightly strengthening
A.2, we assume here that idiosyncratic individual diﬀerences are normally distributed with
variance σ2 > 0.
For α<0, u(0, 0) = −∞ and u(m(x),y(x)) is ﬁnite, regardless of whether x =“Take”
or x =“Share,” so the predicted choice always would be Z = 1. In practice, this implies
that for data sets that include rejections of the ﬁrst-mover oﬀer, the estimate of α will
be positive. When α>0, we have Z = 1 if and only if 0 = u(0,0) <u (m(x),y(x)) =
1
α (m(x)α + θy(x)α) which is equivalent to 0 < (m/y)α + θi =( m/y)α + a + br+ σ  i,o r
− i <σ −1 ((m/y)α +a+br). Hence the probability that Z = 1 is the standard cumulative
normal distribution evaluated at σ−1((m/y)α + a + br), and probit estimation will recover
the structural parameters.
Using the Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher data and the LIMDEP probit procedure, we
searched across various values of α, and found that likelihood was maximized in the vicinity
of α =1 /4 (with α =1 /8 almost as good). The estimated equation is
Pr[Zi]=−0.49 + 0.69ri +2 .00(m/y)α +  i.
The equation predicts correctly 302 of the subjects’ 360 choices. The coeﬃcient estimate
for (m/y)α implies that σ−1 =2 .00 and σ =0 .5, with a p-value of 0.0000. The coeﬃcient
estimate for r,w i t hp-value of 0.001, implies that b = ∂θ/∂r is about 0.69/2o r0 .35. That
is, moving r from 0 to 1 (or from −1 to 0) would on average increase the probability that the
second mover would accept the proposal by about 0.35 of a standard deviation. Likewise,
other things equal, moving relative income m/y from 0.5 to 1 would increase the acceptance
probability by about 2.00(11/4 − (0.5)1/4) ≈ 0.32 of a standard deviation.
13The coeﬃcient estimates are fairly robust to changes in α.F o r α =1 /8 the point
estimates are within 10% of those given, and the coeﬃcient on r doesn’t change much even
for α as low as −4. (With negative α, the portion of the data with m = 0 needs to be
omitted or modiﬁed to avoid the zero divide problem.) The coeﬃcient increases to 1.3a sα
increases to its upper limit of 1, but the ﬁt deteriorates substantially.
5 Evidence from Stackelberg duopoly
Huck, M¨ uller, and Normann (2001, henceforth HMN01) present an experiment in which
randomly matched pairs of subjects play a Stackelberg duopoly game. The ﬁrst mover (F)
chooses an output level x ∈{ 3, 4, 5,...,15}. The second mover (S) observes x and chooses
an output level q ∈{ 3, 4, 5,...,15}. The price is p =3 0−x−q; both players have constant
marginal cost 6 and no ﬁxed cost, so the proﬁt margin for each player is M =2 4− x − q.
Payoﬀs therefore are m = Mqand y = Mx .
Given F’s choice x, the second mover’s choice set is the locus in (m, y) space traced out
by varying q from 3 to 15. As illustrated in ﬁgure 3, it is a parabolic arc that opens toward
the y-axis whose vertex (m, y)=
 
1
4 (24 − x)2, 1
2 (24 − x)x
 
corresponds to q = 1
2 (24 − x).
In ﬁgure 3, F’s choice is x =4 ;S’s choice q = 3 produces payoﬀ vector (51, 68) while
q = 10 produces the vertex payoﬀ vector (100, 40). With x = 4, choices q<10 reduce m
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Figure 3: Feasible joint proﬁts when ﬁrst-mover output is x =4 .
14The standard textbook analysis of this game is that S will always respond to F’s choice
x by choosing q = 1
2 (24−x) to obtain the m-maximizing (vertex) payoﬀ m(x)=1
4(24−x)2,
and that F therefore will choose x = 12 to maximize his component y(x)=1
2(24 − x)x of
the vertex payoﬀ. Hence at the classic Stackelberg equilibrium x = 12, q =6 ,p = 12, and
M = 6, yielding payoﬀs m =3 6a n dy = 72. In the symmetric, simultaneous move Cournot
game, the classic equilibrium choices are x = q = 8 so that p = 14, M =8 ,a n dm = y = 64.
x












Figure 4: Actual choice pairs (x, q) and estimated best response function.
The HMN01 experiment produced a range of outcomes. Although the two most frequent
outcomes are the Cournot equilibrium outcome and the Stackelberg outcome, as shown
in ﬁgure 4, a large fraction (199 of 220) of second-mover outputs meet or exceed those
from the standard, self-interested, best-response function, and this tendency becomes more
pronounced as the ﬁrst-mover output x increases. This second-mover choice pattern arises
naturally from our emotional state-dependent utility function. The intuition is that F
is being greedier when he chooses a larger x, and this pushes the reciprocity variable r(x)
towards more negative values. Hence S has a more negative emotional state θ, and therefore
chooses a larger q to reduce F’s payoﬀ y. This intuition is conﬁrmed in ﬁgure 4: for high
values of the ﬁrst-mover output x, observed choices q from the HMN01 data exceed the
standard best-response, which is shown as the straight line. The estimated best-response
15from our emotional state dependent utility model is shown in ﬁgure 4 as the curve.
Figure 5 further illustrates the intuition behind our model. Panel (a) redraws S’s choice
set from ﬁgure 3 given x = 4, and also includes a tangent indiﬀerence curve for positive
θ. Here S chooses q slightly below the selﬁsh best reply q = 1
2 (24 − x) = 10, reducing his
payoﬀ a bit below m(x)=1
4 (24 − x)2 = 100 while boosting F’s payoﬀ noticeably above
y(x)=1
2(24−x)x = 40. Panel (b) shows S’s choice set given F’s much less generous choice
x = 12. The tangent indiﬀerence curve is for negative θ. Due again to the parabolic choice
set, by increasing q above the selﬁsh best response, S obtains a ﬁrst-order decrease in F’s
payoﬀ from y(x) = 72 while sacriﬁcing only a second-order amount of his own payoﬀ from
m(x) = 36. The key insight is that the attitude of S toward F is a function of the action





(a) Indiﬀerence curve for x = 4. (b) Indiﬀerence curve for x = 12.
















Figure 5: Indiﬀerence curves for utility function estimated from HMN01 data.
The second mover’s utility function can be written in terms of the players’ choices by
substituting the payoﬀ functions m(x, q)a n dy(x, q) into equation (1), while keeping θ(x)






α (24 − x − q)α (qα + θ(x)xα),α  =0 ,
1
α (24 − x − q)1+θ(x) qx θ(x) ,α =0 .
(2)
16Equate to 0 the derivative of (2) with respect to q, and simplify to obtain the ﬁrst order
condition
0=( 2 4− x − 2q)qα−1 − θ(x)xα. (3)
Although (3) is valid for all α ≤ 1, it can be solved for q = q∗(x; θ, α) in closed form only in
special cases. Appendix A.2 demonstrates that a unique maximizer for equation (2) exists
for every parameter vector (θ, α) ∈ (−∞, ∞) × (−∞, 1], so the best response q∗(x; θ, α)
is well deﬁned. Appendix A.3 describes the algorithm used to determine q∗(x; θ, α).
The empirical task is to explain S’s choice q∗(x; θ, α)g i v e nF’s choice x. The last
model element that we need to specify is θ(x). Deﬁne F’s neutral choice as the solution
x = 8 to the equal payoﬀ condition m(x)=y(x). This condition also characterizes the
Cournot equilibrium, and yields m0 = m(8) = 64. In the normalized reciprocity expression
r(x), the denominator is mg − mb =m a x x m(x) − minx m(x)=m(3) − m(15) = 90, so
r(x)= 1
90 (m(x) − m0)= 1
360 (24 − x)2 − 32
45. As in the previous application, the status
variable s is constant and the ﬁrst order Taylor series yields
θ(x)=a + br(x)=a +
b
90
(m(x) − m0). (4)
The HMN01 data we analyze consist of all Stackelberg games with randomly matched
players. These data include twenty-two ﬁrst- and second-movers; each player participated
in ten Stackelberg games. The estimation procedure ﬁnds the parameter vector that mini-
mizes the sum of squared residuals SSR =
 220
i=1 (q∗(xi ; a, b, α) − qi)2 for these 220 choice
pairs (xi,q i). Details of the estimation procedure appear in Appendix A.4. The resulting
parameter estimates (± standard errors) are ˆ a = −0.16 ± 0.05, ˆ b =0 .816 ± 0.28, and
ˆ α =0 .53 ± 0.44. The estimated best-response function is shown in ﬁgure 4; ﬁgure 5 shows
the estimated utility function. The conﬁdence region for these three parameter estimates
is an ellipsoid. Five cross sections through the 95% conﬁdence ellipsoid are depicted in
ﬁgure 6.
The parameter estimates allow us to test several hypotheses. Appendix A.5 details the
























Figure 6: Cross sections through the 95% conﬁdence region for a, b,a n dα.
H.1 The parameter pair (a, b)=( 0 , 0).
This is the natural null hypothesis of selﬁsh preferences, responsive neither to reciprocity
nor to distributional concerns. The F test statistic for the data is F(2,217) = 70.9, which
implies rejection of the hypothesis at a p-value of less than 10−16. The data ﬁrmly support
other-regarding preferences.
H.2 Under the maintained assumption that m0 =6 4 ,t h ep a r a m e t e ra is positive.
In equation (4), the reference proﬁt level m0 and the parameter a are not separately
identiﬁed, since θ(x)=A + b
90 m(x) where A = a − b
90m0. Consequently the choice
m0 = 64, even though we ﬁnd it persuasive, has no impact on the estimates for the reci-
procity parameter b or the distribution (or shape) parameter α. This null hypothesis can
therefore be interpreted as stating that the typical second mover in the HMN01 experiment
has a property right (or reference proﬁt level) that is at or below the Cournot-Nash proﬁt
level m0 = 64. The F statistic for the data is F(1,217) = 10.6, which implies rejection
at the p-value of 0.001. We conclude that the second-movers in this experiment typically
maintain higher reference proﬁt levels.
H.3 The parameter b is zero or negative.
This is the key null hypothesis. It states that, although they may respond to distri-
butional concerns, second movers do not respond to reciprocity concerns (or else respond
18perversely). The F statistic is F(1,217) = 11.7, which implies rejection at the p-value of
less than 0.001. The data ﬁrmly support reciprocal behavior by the typical subject.
6 Further Applications
In an earlier version of the present paper, Cox and Friedman (2002) ﬁt the model in equa-
tion (1) to a fairly complex two player extensive form game called the Moonlighting Game
(MLG). In the MLG, the ﬁrst mover F can send money to or take money from the second
mover S, and the amounts sent are tripled. Then S, at diﬀering personal costs, can increase
or reduce F’s payoﬀ. As in the Stackelberg game just analyzed, S’s choice set depends on
F’s action, and contains a segment with positive slope as well as a segment with negative
slope. Unlike the Stackelberg game, the MLG choice set has a sharp kink between two linear
segments. Much of the data (from an experiment of Cox, Sadiraj and Sadiraj, 2002b) lies
on or very close to the kinks and corners of the budget set. Therefore estimates of model
parameters are not very precise. Qualitatively, the model explains the data quite well. It
predicts correctly that very few interior solutions lie on the positively sloped segment; this
follows from the almost linear indiﬀerence curves for negative θ shown in ﬁgure 1 (b). The
model also captures the strong tendency of second movers to reward ﬁrst mover generosity
and the common tendency to punish ﬁrst mover greed.
Future applications can explore the impact of other aspects of status. Possibly relevant
treatments include age, gender, and observable socioeconomic characteristics, as well as
the process that assigned the second- and ﬁrst-mover roles. Available evidence suggests
that the status variable s interacts strongly with the reciprocity variable r. For example,
the Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2002b) Treatment C data automate ﬁrst movers, and the
second movers’ choices then are generally consistent with θ = 0, suggesting a dominant
interaction r ×s with s =0 . 3 Zizzo and Oswald (2001) found that subjects with low status
3 Alternatively, one could simply deﬁne m0 as the automated choice of the ﬁrst mover and obtain r =0
directly.
19are particularly eager to “burn” the payoﬀs of players with large unearned payoﬀs.
No doubt there are many other existing data sets to which the model can be ﬁt. The
model also suggests new experimental designs for sharper tests and further development.
In particular, consider two player extensive form game experiments that elicit willingness
to pay (WTP) own payoﬀ for other’s payoﬀ, while systematically varying relative income
opportunities y/m, other aspects of status s, and reciprocity considerations r. The data
would allow sharp estimates for the impact of each motive.
To illustrate, continue to hold s constant and take the linear Taylor series approximation
of the systematic portion of the emotional state, θ = a + br, noting that the coeﬃcients a
and b depend on the particular value of s. Use a Taylor series expansion around the equal





















Use the reciprocity variable r(x)=m(x)−m0; this is observable given the ﬁrst mover’s
choice m(x) assuming that m0 is unambiguous. Substitute these expressions into the basic





from Section 3 and use the Taylor series approximation of
θ from Section 3 to obtain
WTP = a + b(m(x) − m0)+( a + b(m(x) − m0))(1 − α)
m−y
y












This equation suggests a simple OLS regression of the elicited WTP on variables formed from
the observable interim allocation m(x) of my payoﬀ, and the ﬁnal allocation of both payoﬀs,
m and y. From the coeﬃcient estimates one recovers the desired structural parameters a,
b,a n dα.
Future applications should also explore games with more than two players. The model
extends directly. My utility function depends on every other player i’s payoﬀ yi,v i am y




(xα + θ1 yα
1 + ...+ θn yα
n).
20Dependence of θi on the motives r and s is the same as in the two player case. Of course,
in games where players can’t separately identify the other players, there is only one θ.
For games in which each player can observe the individual history of every other player,
the model could be enriched to include an indirect reciprocity motive as well as the direct
motive captured in r.
7 Discussion
We hypothesize that a person’s desire to help or harm others depends on emotional states
that arise from universal motives such as reciprocity and status. In this paper we proposed
a simple empirical model incorporating this hypothesis.
The ﬁrst hurdle for an empirical model is tractability: can the model be estimated from
available data? We obtained an aﬃrmative answer by examining two existing data sets,
laboratory studies of mini-ultimatum games (MUG) and Stackelberg duopoly. The MUG
data consist of binary choices from the second mover following binary choices by a ﬁrst
mover. We derived and estimated a probit model that accounted for the data rather well
and that produced parameter estimates consistent with a priori predictions (assumptions
A.3 and A.4). The Stackelberg duopoly data consist of a range of choices by a second mover
following a range of choices by a ﬁrst mover. Again we derived and estimated a model (this
time using non-linear least squares regression) that accounts for the data and produces
parameter estimates that strongly support reciprocal behavior.
Of course, to be considered successful and important, an empirical model must jump
further hurdles. Which variants work best? Can extensions deal with diﬀerent sorts of
data? How well do the best variants compare to alternative models? We close with a few
thoughts on these matters.
Assumption A.2 states that individuals diﬀer only in idiosyncratic additive components
of the emotional state variable θ. The data shown in ﬁgure 4 and other evidence suggests
that people may diﬀer in their responsiveness b to given reciprocity and status motives.
21Therefore future work should consider estimation using random coeﬃcient models.
The deﬁnitions presented here extend directly to extensive form games in which some
players have several moves, to normal form games, and to some other games of incomplete
information. Future empirical work will show how successful such extensions are relative to
available alternatives. Our approach has several advantages that might survive beyond the
current implementation. First of all, it uses a model of preferences and choice, not equi-
librium, and so is tractable and transparent. Second, it is more ﬂexible than distributional
preference models in that it takes other motives into account. Third, it is open to new ﬁnd-
ings in the psychology of emotions and so may facilitate interdisciplinary cross-fertilization.
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27Appendix A.1: Utility function for α =0
Let





α (mα + θyα),α ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1],
myθ,α =0 .
We want to show that for α  = 0, the indiﬀerence curves of u(m, y ; α) converge to indiﬀer-
ence curves of u(m, y ;0 )=myθ. Fix a point (m0,y 0) with m0 > 0a n dy0 > 0. For every
α ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], the set {(m,y):u(m, y ; α)=u(m0,y 0 ; α)} is the indiﬀerence curve for the










It suﬃces to show for each ﬁxed ¯ m>0 that y(¯ m; α) converges pointwise to y(¯ m;0 )=m1/θ
0 y0 ¯ m−1/θ
as α → 0.
The limit of y(¯ m; α)a sα → 0 can be determined by applying L’Hospital’s rule to lny(¯ m; α):
lim
α→0














0 lnm0 + θyα
0 lny0 − ¯ mα ln ¯ m
θ
.
From this it follows that
lny(¯ m;0 )=
lnm0 + θ lny0 − ln ¯ m
θ
so along the indiﬀerence curves of u(m, y ; 0), myθ = m0 y θ
0 , which is the required result.
Appendix A.2: Deﬁnition of the best-response function q∗(x; θ, α)
Theorem 1:F o r e a c h x ∈ (0, 24) and each (θ, α) ∈ (−∞, ∞) × (−∞, 1] there is a unique
q∗ ∈ (0, 24 − x] that maximizes the utility function U(x, q)= 1
α (24 − x − q)α (qα + θx α).
Proof: We partition the space of values for θ, α,a n dx into a connected (relatively) open set A
with a unique interior solution to the utility maximization problem and into a connected closed set
B with a boundary solution to the utility maximization problem. The boundary between sets A





B is subdivided into a region B1 where the utility function is bounded, and a region B2 where the
utility function has an asymptote as q → 24 − x. Figure A.2.1 (a) shows these three regions in a




















Figure A.2.1: Regions evaluated to characterize the best response function
In order to evaluate properties of U(x, q), it is useful to represent the output q of S as




(1 − c)α (24 − x)α (cα (24 − x)α + θx α). (A.2.1)
The derivative of this utility function is
˜ U
 
x(c)=( 1− c)α−1 (24 − x)α ((1 − 2c)cα−1 (24 − x)α − θxα). (A.2.2)
For c ∈ (0, 1), ˜ U
 
x(c) = 0 if and only if fx(c) ≡ (1 − 2c)cα−1 (24 − x)α − θxα is zero. Lemma 1
shows that for α ∈ [−2, 0) ∪ (0, 1), fx(c) is a convex function, so that fx(c) has at most two roots.
Lemma 2 shows that for α ∈ (−∞, −2), fx(c)i sc o n v e xo na ni n t e r v a l( 0 ,c  ) and monotonically
increasing on (c , 1), so that it again has at most two roots. The two lemmas are used subsequently
to prove Claims 1 through 3, which show that there is a unique maximizer of ˜ Ux(c) for regions A,
B1,a n dB2. Claims 4 and 5 treat the cases α =0a n dα = 1 separately, but shows that they are
consistent with the other cases. Theorem 1 follows from Claim 1 through 5.
Lemma 1:F o r α ∈ [−2, 0) ∪ (0, 1), fx(c) is a convex function of c, for all c ∈ (0, 1). Therefore
the ﬁrst-order condition for a local maximum, ˜ U
 
x(c) = 0, has at most two roots in (0, 1) for these
values of α.
Proof:F o r α ∈ (−∞, 0)∪(0, 1], f
  
x (c)(α−1)cα−3 (24−x)α (α−2αc−2). For α<1, this has
the opposite sign from the last term, so fx(c) is convex when α − 2αc− 2 < 0. For α ∈ (0, 1)
and for α ∈ [−2, 0) this inequality holds for all c ∈ (0, 1). Hence for α ∈ [−2, 0) ∪ (0, 1),
fx(c)i sc o n v e x .





, and it is a strictly




. Therefore, fx(c) has at most two roots on (0, 1).
Proof: As noted in the proof of Lemma 1, fx(c) is convex only if α − 2αc− 2 < 0. For
α<0 this is equivalent to the inequality c<α−2
2α ,a n di fα<−2, then α−2
2α < 1 so that







x(c)=cα−2 (24−x)α (α−2αc−1) is positive
for c>α−1
2α ,a n dα−1
2α < α−2
2α when α<−2. The conclusion of the lemma follows from this
observation.
Claim 1: In region A, with θ>θ (x, α), there is a unique value c∗ ∈ (0, 1) where ˜ U x(c) takes on
its maximum value.
Proof:A s c → 0, ˜ U
 
x(c) →∞ , so the value of c that maximizes ˜ Ux(c) is in the interval
(0, 1]. As c → 1, the ﬁrst term in equation (A.2.2) approaches ∞, the second term is ﬁnite,
and the last term has the ﬁnite limit g(x) ≡− (24 − x)α − θx α. Whether ˜ U
 
x(c) approaches
+∞,0 ,o r−∞ as c → 1 therefore depends on the sign of the last term, which is fx(c).
Since limc→0 fx(c)=∞ and limc→1 fx(c)=g(x) is negative for θ>θ (x, α), fx(c) changes
sign on (0, 1) at least once. By Lemma 1, fx(c) changes sign at most twice in (0, 1) for
α ∈ [−2, 0) ∪ (0, 1) (and hence ˜ U
 
x(c) changes sign at most twice). By Lemma 2, fx(c)
changes sign at most twice in (0, 1) for α ∈ (−∞, −2). Therefore there are at most two roots
of fx(c)=0i n( 0 , 1) (and equivalently, there are at most two roots of the ﬁrst order condition
˜ U
 
x(c) = 0). As c → 1, fx(c) → g(x)a n dg(x) < 0 in region A. Since fx(c) approaches a
negative limit as c → 1, it has a unique root in (0, 1), which demonstrates that ˜ U
 
x(c)=0
has a unique root in (0, 1).
Claim 2: In region B1, with θ ≤ θ(x, α)a n dα ∈ (0, 1), we show that ˜ U
 
x(c) > 0 for all ac ∈ (0, 1),
so that there is a boundary maximum of ˜ Ux(c)a tc = 1, i.e., q∗ =2 4− x.
Proof: The sign of ˜ U
 
x(c) is the same as the sign of fx(c), so it is suﬃcient to show that
fx(c) > 0 at its minimum on (0, 1). The argument below demonstrates ﬁrst that fx(c)i s
decreasing on (0, 1) so that it takes on its minimum at c = 1 and then shows that fx(1) > 0
so that ˜ U
 
x(c) > 0 for all c ∈ (0, 1).
Since f
 
x(c)=cα−2 (24 − x)α (c − 2cα− 1), f
 
x(c) < 0 if and only if c − 2cα− 1 < 0. The
last inequality is equivalent to the inequality c>α−1
2α for α<0. Since this inequality holds
30for all α ∈ (0, 1), fx(c) is decreasing on (0, 1). Since fx(1) = g(x), and g(x) is positive in
region B1, it follows that ˜ U
 
x(c) > 0 for all c ∈ (0, 1).
Claim 3: In region B2, with θ ≤ θ(x, α)a n dα<0, we show that for any c  < 1, ˜ Ux(c) is bounded
for c ∈ [0,c  ]a n d˜ Ux(c) →∞as c → 1 so that there is an asymptote of the utility function at c =1 .
Consequently, there is a boundary maximum of ˜ Ux(c)a tc = 1, i.e., q∗ =2 4− x.
Proof: It is clear from equation (A.2.1) that ˜ Ux(c) is bounded for c ∈ [0,c  ]. As c → 1, the
term (1 − c)α →∞for α<0, and the ﬁrst and third terms are both ﬁnite, so ˜ Ux(c) →∞if
the last term, cα (24 − x)α + θxα, tends to a negative limit as c → 1. Since θ<θ (x, α)i n
region B2 and this expression is equivalent to (24 − x)α + θxα, the claim follows.
Claim 4:F o r α = 0, there is a unique maximum of U(x, q)a tq∗ = 24−x
2+θ when θ>−1 and there
is a unique maximum of U(x, q)a tq∗ =2 4− x when θ ≤− 1.
Proof: This follows immediately from the utility maximization problem for α =0 .
Claim 5:F o r α = 1, there is a unique maximum of U(x, q)a tq∗ =1 2− 1+θ
2 x when θ>θ (x, 1)
and there is a unique maximum of U(x, q)a tq∗ =2 4− x when θ ≤ θ(x, 1).
Proof: This follows immediately from the utility maximization problem for α =1 .
Appendix A.3: Calculation of q∗(x; θ, α)
Claim 1 in Appendix A.2 demonstrates that for all (x, θ, α) ∈ B1 ∪ B2 (where θ<θ (x, α)),
U(x, q) takes on its maximum at q =2 4− x. Claim 1 also demonstrates that (1) if (x, θ, α) ∈ A,
then U (x, 0) = ∞ and U (x, 24−x) < 0 and (2) U (x, q) has a single root in (0, 24−x). We use (1)
and (2) to calculate q∗(x; a, b, α). Since the derivative is inﬁnite at q = 0, we start by evaluating
U (x, 1). If U (x, 1) > 0 we use the secant method with U (x, 1) and U (x, 24 − x) to ﬁnd q∗ such
that U (x, q∗)=0 .I fU (x, 1) < 0, we bisect the interval until we ﬁnd 2−k such that U (x, 2−k) > 0,
and then apply the secant method to identify q∗ such that U (x, q∗)=0 .
Appendix A.4: Gauss-Newton non-linear regression
The general form of the Gauss-Newton non-linear regression is





where β (j) is the parameter estimate after j iterations of the Gauss-Newton algorithm, D (j) is an
approximation to the Hessian matrix of the regressors, g (j) is the gradient of SSR(β (j)), and c(j)
31is a constant that is chosen to assure convergence. (In this application, the regressor functions
are q∗  
x; β (j) 
. See Davidson and MacKinnon [1993, pp. 201-5] for a general formulation of the
Gauss-Newton method in non-linear least squares.) This appendix describes the choices of D (j) and
c(j) used to ﬁnd parameter estimates for the Stackelberg game. For notational convenience, the
parameter triple (a, b, α)a n dβ are used interchangeably throughout this appendix.
The matrix D (j) is constructed from the Jacobian matrix J(β) of the regressors, which in this
case is the best-response function q∗(x; a, b, α). The jth row of J(β) is the derivative of the regressor
q∗(x; a, b, α) evaluated at the jth observation xj, i.e.,
(Jn, 1(β),J n, 2(β),J n, 3(β))
 
∂q∗(xn ; a, b, α)
∂a
,
∂q∗(xn ; a, b, α)
∂b
,




We take D (j) =2J
 




+ I. With β (j+1) deﬁned as in equation (A.4.1), SSR
 
β (j+1) 
may be greater than SSR
 
β (j) 







. In the algorithm we employ, c(j) =2 −k, where k is the ﬁrst value from







In addition to the iterative Gauss-Newton parameter estimation procedure above, there are two
other aspects of the algorithm that we should note. First, iterations continue so long as the maximum
of the diﬀerences
   a(j+1) − a(j)   ,
   b(j+1) − b(j)   ,
   α(j+1) − α(j)   ,a n d





β (j)    
is greater than 10−8. Finally, once the adjustment of both the parameter estimates and the SSR is
below the threshold 10−8 and a parameter estimate β (j
∗) is obtained, we conduct a grid search over
SSR(β) in a region around β (j
∗) to insure that β (j
∗) minimizes SSR(β).
Appendix A.5: Tests of hypotheses
H.1 The parameter pair (a, b)=( 0 , 0).
When a and b are both restricted to be zero (so that the model is restricted to the standard
model of individualistic preferences), SSR = 1476.5. The F statistic is
SSR(˜ β) − SSR(ˆ β)/2





where ˜ β is the parameter estimate pair for the restricted model and ˆ β is the parameter estimate
pair for the unrestricted model. The cumulative distribution of F(2,217) at 70.9 is greater than
1 − 10−16, so we are able to reject the hypothesis that preferences are individualistic with a p-value
of less than 10−16.
32H.2 For m0 =6 4(which is the Cournot-Nash proﬁt level for S), the parameter a is positive.
When a is restricted to be greater than or equal to zero, SSR is minimized at a =0 ,b =1 .14,
and c =0 .78. For these parameters, SSR = 936.4. The F statistic for the test of the hypothesis that
a>0i s
SSR(˜ β) − SSR(ˆ β)/1





where ˜ β is the parameter estimate pair for the restricted model and ˆ β is the parameter estimate
pair for the unrestricted model. The cumulative distribution of F(1,217) at 10.6i s0 .999, so the
hypothesis that a>0 can be rejected with a p-value of 0.001, i.e., we can reject the hypothesis that
the second mover has a reference proﬁt level that is at or below the Cournot-Nash proﬁt level.
H.3 The parameter b is negative.
When b is restricted to be less than or equal to 0, SSR is minimized when a = −0.30, b =0 ,a n d
c =1 .00. For these parameters, SSR = 941.0. The F statistic for the test of the hypothesis that
b<0i s
SSR(˜ β) − SSR(ˆ β)/1





The cumulative distribution of F(1,217) at 11.7 is greater than 0.999, so the hypothesis that b<0
can be rejected with a p-value of less than 0.001.
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